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Bauguess v. Paine: The Denial of the Attorney Fee
Sanction at the (Mis)Trial Stage
In his analysis of the California Supreme Court's opinion in Baugess, the
author outlines the traditional policy rationale for awards of attorney's
fees, examines the particular factual setting in Baugess, and concludes
that while the case may have been correctly decided on its facts, the rule
propounded is overbroad in its blanket denial of trial court authority to
award attorney's fees to an aggrieved party where an adversary attorney's
misconduct wrongfully causes a mistrial.
Exercising rare judicial restraint, the California Supreme Court
in Bauguess v. Paine' refused to carve out another exception to
the general rule disallowing attorney's fees absent statutory au-
thorization.2 Reviewing a lower court decision awarding attor-
ney's fees as a sanction for what was believed to be intentional
counselor misconduct causing mistrial, the high court reversed,
finding that the trial court had exceeded its inherent powers.
Unique to the case was the interplay between two bodies of le-
gal authority governing the awarding of attorney's fees; one deal-
ing with judicial supervisory power, generally evident in the pre-
trial discovery context,3 and one dealing with a court's legal and
1. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978).
2. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1955). The general common law rule, as
codified, provides, in pertinent part:
Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is
left to agreement, express or implied, of the parties....
3. Supervisory powers of the court are provided for generally in two Califor-
nia statutes. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128 (West Supp. 1979) provides, in pertinent
part:
Every court shall have power.
3). To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its of-
ficers;
4). To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the
orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending
therein;
5). To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial of-
ficers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judi-
cial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 187 (West 1954) provides:
When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other
statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to
carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if
the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or
equitable powers at the post-trial stage.4 While attorney's fees
have been granted pursuant to one or both of the powers, the
supreme court decided neither was dispositive nor sufficient to
award fees in the mistrial context.5
In light of the majority's interpretation of the facts,6 the deci-
sion was undoubtedly based upon the trial court's abuse of dis-
cretion in handling the matter. Utilizing an analytical approach
and ignoring the aspect of attorney misconduct however, the
court articulated an overinclusive rule to be applied when such
impropriety is evident.
I. FACTS
The case at the trial court level involved a personal injury suit.
Diagrams of the accident scene had been admitted into evidence
and used as note paper by the jurors, accompanied by the strong
admonition that the panel was not to share their written observa-
tions with other individuals. 7 Upon discovering that the appel-
lant, as plantiffs attorney, had asked for and received access to
the diagrams after the culmination of the day's proceedings,
Judge Lucian B. Vandegrift confronted him the following day with
an accusation of intentional misconduct.
Appellant vehemently denied he had acted improperly. He con-
tended once an item has been officially admitted into evidence,
opposing counsel has the right and duty to examine it thoroughly.
the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.
The Civil Discovery Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2025. (West Supp. 1979) al-
lows for implementation of judicial supervisory powers throughout the pre-trial
discovery context and most clearly outlines how the power may be exercised in
CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West Supp. 1979), which provides for contempt and
attorney fee sanctions when a party fails to obey court orders or refuses to cooper-
ate with the discovery processes.
4. See note 2, supra for the general legal rule regarding attorney fees. Excep-
tions have been codified, however, and govern along with judicially carved equita-
ble exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 1979). For
judicial equitable exceptions see notes 17-19, infra. An excellent brief discussion
of the American inroads into the general rule and a demand for provisional refor-
mation of that rule is contained in Sands, Attorneys Fees as Recoverable Costs, 63
A.B.A. J. 510 (1977).
5. 22 Cal. 3d at 639, 586 P.2d 950, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
6. See text at notes 9-11, infra. Cf. text at notes 47 and 48 infra, regarding Jus-
tice William P. Clark, Jr.'s interpretation of the facts.
7. The diagrams involved were copies of a policeman's sketch of the accident
scene. One copy was given to each of the jurors during the patrolman's testimony
but the court neglected to collect the diagrams at the close of his testimony. Upon
later observing the jurors taking notes on the diagrams, the judge instructed the
jury that they would be permitted to take notes as long as they were kept confi-
dential. He then asked the clerk to collect the diagrams and supply note paper to
the jurors. After the trial had recessed for the evening, appellant asked permis-
sion of the clerk to examine all of the diagrams and was allowed to do so.
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Construing appellant's assertion as an attack on the court's
power, Judge Vandegrift granted defendant's motion for mistrial
due to prejudice. Indicating contempt or other disciplinary action
might be appropriate, the judge granted defendant a hearing on
his motion to award attorney's fees for the two days of aborted
trial and continued the matter.
In the subsequent hearing, Judge Vandegrift ordered the appel-
lant to pay the defendant $700 in attorney's fees as a sanction for
his misconduct, characterizing the award as an alternative to pen-
alty for contempt.8
The California Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that,
in the absence of statutory authorization, a trial court has no
power to award attorney's fees upon mistrial. Finding neither eq-
uitable nor supervisory considerations justifying such an award,
the court reasoned that an extension of such power to the trial
court level would be unfounded and unwise.
II. A PROPER RULING IN LIGHT OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In overturning the trial court's judgment awarding attorney's
fees, the California Supreme Court confines its analysis to the
facts of the case, interpreting the facts as not constituting true at-
torney misconduct. Unfortunately, the court does not limit the
rule and, as a result, denies the attorney fee sanction in all mis-
trial situations, whether or not they are caused by lawyer impro-
priety.
A cursory reading of the majority opinion makes clear that the
court finds the allegations of attorney misconduct to be invalid.9
In summarizing the facts of the case, the court downplays the
conduct of appellant and refuses to consider his examination of
the evidentiary diagrams as prejudicial.10 Rather, it concludes
that the trial court committed three errors which resulted in the
8. 22 Cal. 3d at 633-34, 586 P.2d at 946, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
9. Justice Clark, in his dissent, recognizes this fact when he states, "They
[the majority] suggest that Bach [appellant] is innocent of any misconduct....
22 Cal. 3d at 642, 586 P.2d at 951, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
10. Evidencing their interpretation of the appellant's actions at the outset, the
majority states, "He took the exhibit, looked at it briefly, and returned it." 22 Cal.
3d at 632, 586 P.2d at 945, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 464. Cf. Justice Clark's opposite view:
"It is clear Bach did not casually examine exhibit 7..." Id. at 641, 586 P.2d at 951,
150 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
abuse of judicial discretion," and which, standing alone, demand
reversal in the particular context.
A. The Conflict Between the Rules of Evidence and the
Supervisory Powers at the Trial Court Level
In Bauguess, the trial judge created a conflict between the rules
of evidence, and his own supervisory powers which ultimately led
to the mistrial. Erroneously believing that only those items ad-
mitted into evidence can be shown to the jury, the judge admitted
the diagrams before distributing them among the jurors, accom-
panying their distribution with a warning to keep any notes writ-
ten thereon confidential. However, by officially admitting the
diagrams into evidence, the judge ignored the general rule that
any document admitted into evidence may be inspected at any
time by counsel.12 When the appellant examined the diagrams
during a court recess, he was merely exercising his right as plain-
tiff's counsel (although in obvious disregard of the judge's inten-
tion to keep the jurors' notes confidential).13 By designating the
diagrams as evidence and negligently allowing the jurors to make
notes upon them, the trial judge was primarily responsible for
any prejudice that may have resulted from the appellant's actions
and could not properly assess attorney's fees against the appel-
lant for causing the mistrial.
B. The Evasion of Appropriate Contempt Sanctions
The trial judge erred when he wrongfully chose to levy attor-
ney's fees as a penalty, rather than more traditional contempt
sanctions. This becomes obvious when comparing the various
purposes behind contempt sanctions and those rules permitting
attorney's fees, and in examining the trial court's motive in mak-
ing the award.
It has been well established that the legislative purposes be-
hind the contempt sanctions provided in California's Code of Civil
11. "Abuse of discretion" is the standard of review which must be met in order
for an appellate court to overturn the trial court's award of attorney fees. See
Baker v. Eilers Music Co., 175 Cal. 652, 654, 166 P. 1006, 1007 (1917); Hadden v. Wal-
deck, 9 Cal. 2d 631, 72 P.2d 114 (1937). See generally 6 WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE, Appeal §§ 242-45, at 4234-36 (2d ed. 1971). For a traditional definition, see
note 35, infra.
12. 22 Cal. 3d at 636 n.6, 586 P.2d at 948 n.6, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.6. See Pape v.
Dalton, 40 Cal. 638 (1871); 31 CAL. JuR. 3D, Evidence § 211 (1976). Indeed, as part of
the judicial record, exhibits become public and may be inspected by anyone ab-
sent a lawful order to the contrary. Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782-83,
136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823-24 (1977).
13. 22 Cal. 3d at 636 n.6, 586 P.2d at 948 n.6, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467 n.6.
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Procedure Section 1218,14 are two-fold: 1) To protect judicial integ-
rity and punish any disrespect for that integrity 5 and 2) to com-
pel the proper and orderly conduct of judicial proceedings,
including obedience to court order.' 6 On the other hand, legal
and equitable rules allowing attorney's fees are based on a
number of objectives, some of which correspond to the second
purpose governing the usage of contempt sanctions. Equity al-
lows attorney's fees in order to deny unjust enrichment, 7 en-
courage suits effectuating strong public policy,' 8 discourage
vexatious or burdensome lawsuits,19 and compensate needless ex-
pense brought about through fraud.20 Legal allowances are aimed
at consummating contractual agreements, 2' compelling obedience
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218 (West 1979) provides for a fine not exceeding
$500 or imprisonment not exceeding five days, upon finding a person guilty of con-
tempt.
15. See In Re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d 237, 514 P.2d 1201, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1973),
cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974); People v. Fusarco, 18 Cal. App. 3d 877, 96 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1971).
16. Rosato v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied 427 U.S. 912 (1975); See In Re Hagan, 224 Cal. App. 2d
590, 36 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1964).
17. "Common fund" and "substantial benefit" theories support equitable al-
lowances of attorney's fees to stem unjust enrichment. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.
3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977), defines both of these theories and
contains an excellent in-depth discussions of them. The "common fund" principle
goes into effect when a number of persons are, in common, entitled to a specific
fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the crea-
tion or preservation of that fund. In such a case, plaintiff may be awarded attor-
ney's fees out of the fund, thus denying unjust enrichment to the others who will
receive benefits of the fund without an outlay of expense. (See, e.g., Estate of
Reade, 31 Cal. 2d 669, 191 P.2d 745; see also 4 WrrIKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judg-
ment, §§ 129-133, at 3278-83 (2d ed. 1971).) A "substantial benefit" rule may be ap-
plied when a class action or corporate derivative action results in the conferral of
substantial benefits upon the defendant. Consequently, the defendant may be re-
quired to yield some of those benefits in the form of attorney's fees. (See Knoff v.
City of San Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969); Fletcher v. A.J.
Industries, 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968); see also 4 WrrKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment, § 134, at 3283-84 (2d ed. 1971).)
18. See the "private attorney general" theory adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 24, 42-50, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-17, 141
Cal. Rptr. 315, 324-29 (1977). For a discussion of California's development of the
theory see McDermott, Forward: The Private Attorney General Rule and Public
Interest Litigation in California, 66 CAL. L. REV. 138 (1978).
19. See Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (E.D. Ark.), affd. 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Board, 321 F. 2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
20. See Glendale Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Develop-
ment, Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1977); Prentice v. North Am. Title
Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 381 P.2d 645, 30 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963).
21. See note 2, supra.
to discovery orders,22 and compensating a party who has been
forced to litigate a discovery issue needlessly.23 While compelling
obedience to a court order is a common rationale behind both
contempt sanctions and attorney fee awards, none of the legal or
equitable rules authorize attorney's fees solely as punishment for
irreverence before the court.24 In Bauguess, the supreme court
clearly indicates that punishment was the trial judge's motivation
for assessing attorney's fees against the appellant.
The first confrontation between appellant and trial judge con-
cerning the diagrams was described as an "acrimonious" discus-
sion 25 in which the court was "particularly displeased" with the
attorney's position.26 "Construing this position as an attack on its
powers, the court informed appellant that his position constituted
contempt of court" (emphasis added). 27
At the hearing on respondent's motion for attorney's fees, the
trial court reiterated its displeasure with appellant's conduct 28
and later found the appellant in direct contempt for "violat[ing]
the court's order."29 The judge, however, declined to impose fur-
ther amercement because of his characterization of the attorney's
fees already assessed as "an alternative to a penalty for con-
tempt."30
Indeed, the high court specifically delineates the factors that
led to the trial court sanction, stating that "[a]lthough ostensibly
awarded to compensate respondents. . . ," (emphasis added) the
sanction was prompted more by appellant's vigorous argument
22. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West Supp. 1979); See also Stein v. Has-
sen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 294, 109 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1973); Peterson v. City of Vallejo, 259
Cal. App. 2d 757, 66 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1968).
23. See Allen v. Pitchess, 36 Cal. App. 3d 321, 111 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1973); Siger-
seth v. Superior Court for L.A. County, 23 Cal. App. 3d 427, 100 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1972).
24. Under the Civil Discovery Act, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 2016-2025. (West
Supp. 1979), assessment of attorney's fees as punishment is exclusively forbidden.
See Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr 147 (1966). A
number of interesting recent cases have challenged the constitutionality of impris-
onment for contempt charges as cruel and unusual punishment. These challenges,
for the most part, have been unsuccessful. For the most interesting and controver-
sial of these, see In Re Far, 36 Cal. App. 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
25. 22 Cal. 3d at 632, 586 P. 2d at 945, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 464. "Acrimonious" is
defined as "bitter" and "caustic in temper, manner, or speech." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 12 (2d ed. 1972).
26. 22 Cal. 3d at 632, 586 P.2d at 945, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
27. 22 Cal. 3d at 633, 586 P.2d at 946, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
28. Judge Vandegrift exclaimed, "[What] would make me happier than any-
thing in the world is to have you just maybe eat a little humble pie and admit that
you made a mistake in judgment and its not going to happen again." Id. at 633, 586
P.2d at 946, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
29. Id. at 634, 586 P.2d at 946, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
30. Id.
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and refusal to apologize.3 1
These statements, coupled with the court's concern that the
amount demanded of appellant was in excess of the $500 limit al-
lowed for contempt,32 suggests that the trial judge labelled the as-
sessment "attorney fees" rather than "punishment for contempt"
merely because he desired to avoid the monetary ceiling on con-
tempt sanctions.33
It is clear that the trial judge imposed the attorney fee sanction
to punish the appellant for his alleged lack of respect but failed to
utilize the appropriate contempt measures. 34 Instead, he at-
tempted to evade the statutory limitation placed on contempt by
describing the sanction as "attorney's fees." In so doing, he
abused his discretion, and acted in a manner unbecoming to his
position.35
C. The Post-Trial Hearing was Tainted by the Judge's Refusal to
Relinquish the Bench
Generally, a trial judge may sit in judgment of contempt behav-
ior that occurs before him unless he has become so "personally
embroiled" with a lwayer in the trial that he is found unfit to do
so.3 6 Ultimately the determination is made by inquiry into actual
bias on the judge's part and into the possible appearance of bias
and the likelihood that prejudice may exist.37
31. Id. at 639, 586 P.2d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
32. Id. at 637-39, 586 P.2d 948-50, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467-68. See text accompany-
ing note 14, supra. See also text accompanying notes 33 and 34 and note 92, infra.
33. Unfortunately, the court approaches the issue from this angle without con-
sidering the validity of greater awards absent ulterior motives, ie. when compensa-
tion of the innocent party would be the motivating factor rather than punishment.
Concern for avoiding the monetary limit is proper in the contempt context but
when compensation is the catalyst, different legislative intentions prevail and the
concern is unfounded. See text at notes 76 and 77 and note 92, infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 14 and 15, supra. For a general discussion of
contempt and its effect on the trial attorney, see Comment, Contempt of Court and
the Legal Profession, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 463.
35. The classic definition of judicial discretion is contained in Bailey v. Taaffe,
29 Cal. 422, 424 (1866): "The discretion intended... [is] an impartial discretion,
guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. [It is] to be exer-
cised ... in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of sub-
stantial justice." See also note 11, supra.
36. In Re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d 237, 256, 514 P.2d 1201, 1213, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 133
(1973) (quoting Mayberry v. Penn, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1970)) See DeGeorge v. Supe-
rior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 305, 315, 114 Cal. Rptr. 860, 867 (1974).
37. See In Re Martin, 71 Cal. App. 3d 472, 480, 139 Cal. Rptr. 451, 456 (1977),
(quoting Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974)).
It is apparent that the trial judge acted imprudently on a third
occasion when he decided to preside over the post-trial hearing.
The facts above clearly indicate that the trial judge became "per-
sonally embroiled" with the appellant. The judge's numerous
threats to impose a contempt citation, his repeated expressions of
personal displeasure with appellant, even after the jury had been
dismissed, and his summary denial of appellant's requests before
the hearing display a predisposition of bias,38 for which he should
have disqualified himself.39 When he did not withdraw, he erred
irreversibly and abused his discretion.
Assuming, arguendo, the majority's refusal to find attorney mis-
conduct was correct and in consideration of the three errors com-
mitted by the trial judge, it would appear that the proper result
was achieved in the particular set of facts found in Bauguess.
The lower court abused its discretion and because the appellant
had not acted improperly, the decision imposing attorney fee
sanctions was reversed.
Unfortunately, the reasoning and language chosen by the
supreme court was overbroad and not confined to the specific
facts involved. Without adequate consideration of the miscon-
duct/mistrial situation in a general sense, the court articulated a
rule denying attorney's fees in all mistrial contexts, creating the
potential for injustice to those parties suffering needless expense
in the face of counselor impropriety.
III. AN IMPROPER RULE WHEN APPLIED TO THE
MISCONDUCT/MISTRIA CONTEXT
The supreme court in Bauguess frames its analysis simply, stat-
ing the general rule initially and then delineating its exceptions.
Traditionally, the general rule has been that each litigant must
bear his or her own attorney's fees, absent statutory authorization
or agreement among the parties.40 Since an argument for attor-
38. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d at 633, 586 P.2d 946, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 464-65.
See also In Re Martin, 71 Cal. App. 3d 472, 139 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1977) where just such
a showing of predisposition was found to be proof of possible bias and was pro-
nounced abuse of discretion by the trial court.
39. See In Re Martin, 71 Cal. App. at 481-82, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57.
40. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1021 (West 1955) and note 2, supra. See also
Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 620, 381 P.2d 645, 647, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 823 (1963). The reasons behind the general rule against fee shifting are
summarized in Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1976). They include: the philosophies that "one should not be penalized for
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly
discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for los-
ing included the fees of their opponent's counsel." (Fleischman Corp. v. Maier
Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)); the difficulties of proof inherent in litigating
what constitutes reasonable attorney fees (F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co.,
[Vol. 7: 195, 19791 Bauguess v. Paine
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ney's fees following mistrial will not qualify under the general
rule,41 the court dedicates its opinion to a consideration of the ex-
ceptions to the rule. These exceptions are grouped into two cate-
gories: 1) equitable allowances, justified by the historic powers of
equity courts42 and 2) awards based upon the supervisory powers
inherent in all courts, enabling them to carry out their duties. 43
Dealing initially with the equitable exceptions, the court briefly
described the reasons behind such awards, using Serrano v.
Priest as its sole authority." In Serrano there was "a finding that
compelling reasons of public policy warranted such an award. '45
Inasmuch as the court found that the trial court award was not
motivated by public policy and because it felt that the equities of
the case did not require the burden of attorney's fees to shift, the
court concluded that the equitable exceptions did not apply.
The court's rationale for finding burden shifting inappropriate,
however, was that the appellant was not "solely responsible" for
the events leading to mistrial and should not have been required
to bear the expenses involved.46 The court did not discuss the
prospect in which the attorney alone is responsible for the events
bringing about mistrial.
Justice William P. Clark, Jr., makes clear in his dissenting opin-
ion that Bauguess was just such an instance.47 Considering addi-
tional facts, Clark explains that the diagrams originally passed
among the jurors were supplied by the appellant himself and that
he undoubtedly had access to other identical copies. Clark indi-
cates that the appellant acted deliberately to obtain "information
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)); the threat posed to the principles of independent advo-
cacy. Id. Cf. Bauguess v. Paine at 637-38, 586 P.2d at 948-49, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467-68.
41. In California there is no express statutory authorization for awarding at-
torney's fees upon mistrial.
42. See text accompanying notes 17-20, supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 3, 22 and 33, supra.
44. 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977).
45. Id. at 42-47, 569 P.2d at 1312-15, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 324-27; Bauguess v. Paine,
22 Cal. 3d at 636, 586 P.2d at 947, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
46. Id. at 636-37, 586 P.2d at 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
47. Id. at 640-43, 586 P.2d at 950-52, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 469-71. Expressing disap-
pointment that the majority would condone "Bach's astonishing imposition upon
the orderly procedures of the court. . . " Justice Clark scoffs at its suggestion that
appellant was innocent of misconduct because the admonitions of confidentiality
had not been directed specifically to him. Id. at 641-42, 586 P.2d at 951, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 470. But see majority opinion, id. at 636 n.6, 586 P.2d at 948 n.6, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 467 n.6.
which might [have given] him a competitive advantage" 48 by re-
vealing the jurors' impressions of the proceedings. From these
additional facts, it does appear the appellant was not merely exer-
cising an evidentiary right but was intentionally disobeying the
spirit of Judge Vandegrift's order. While the order was not di-
rectly addressed to appellant, it was clearly meant to protect
agAinst unfair advantage on the part of either party and to avoid
the possibility of mistrial. When appellant examined the juror's
notes, he blatantly disregarded the court's noble motive and de-
fied the court to exercise its supervisory powers, playing one set
of rules against another. Knowingly endangering the entire pro-
ceeding, appellant was culpable and in Justice Clark's view,
should have been forced to compensate the opposing party for the
waste of time and money he caused.
If such an interpretation was accepted or if such a case arose
with a clearer indication of attorney misconduct, the majority's
analysis would prove deficient and the rule it laid down would
seem to require revision.
A. Equitable Justification for the Attorney Fee Sanction
Under circumstances where attorney misconduct independently
causes mistrial, the aspects of compelling public policy and over-
riding equitable considerations warrant the levying of attorney
fee sanctions against the culpable lawyer.49
Equity steps in where one has been harmed and left without an
adequate remedy at law.5 0 In the event of misconduct causing
mistrial, just such a situation exists. Certainly the party dis-
missed from court because of the intentional misbehavior of op-
posing counsel has been harmed monetarily, with no legal
remedy at his disposal. Unlike the party employing the malefac-
tor, the opposing party cannot sue for malpractice and recover
fees he has been forced to pay for needless litigation. 51 While the
California Bar Association and the ABA Code of Professional Re-
48. Id. at 641, 586 P.2d at 951, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
49. Contempt sanctions in such an instance might adequately penalize the at-
torney but would be ineffective to equitably replenish financial resources of the
opposing party. While contempt is the appropriate method for punishing miscon-
duct, such punishment would be only an ancillary affect in the mistrial situation.
The additional factor of resulting mistrial would remove the case from the many
involving mere attorney insolence demanding punishment and would bring to the
forefront the court's intent to compensate the injured party.
50. See Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 837-38, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93
(1976). Though the case discusses the justifications for certain equitable al-
lowances, it is also likely to be the strongest authority for denying such allowances
in the face of bad faith litigation. See also Dewitt v. Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 469, 56 Am.
Dec. 352 (1852).
51. For the inclusion of attorney's fees as an element of legal malpractice, see
[Vol. 7: 195, 1979] Bauguess v. Paine
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sponsibility provide in-house regulations and administrative chas-
tisements for wayward attorneys,5 2 such sanctions are by no
means adequate compensation to the party actually harmed.
Presently, under analogous circumstances, equity provides
compensation, in the form of attorney's fees, to one forced to liti-
gate needlessly. When a person, due to the tort (generally mis-
representation) of another, is required to act in the protection of
his or her interests by bringing or defending an action against a
third person, he or she is entitled to recover attorney's fees from
the offending party.5 3
In much the same way, a party forced to sacrifice time already
invested in court has unnecessarily been required to defend his
own interest against a third party plaintiff, due to prejudice
caused by counselor impropriety. In Bauguess, appellant's con-
duct transposed two days to litigation into needless expenditures
and caused respondent to make an unnecesary defense of his in-
terest.54
The misconduct/mistrial is similar to the "bad faith litigant" sit-
uation in which attorney's fees are awarded not only to compen-
sate the innocent party but also to deter "bad faith" activities
within litigation. Both federally and in California, attorney's fees
can be assessed against a party who brings suit in "bad faith" or
Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201-202, 491 P.2d 433, 437, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1971).
See generally 45 A.L.R. 62-71 (1956).
52. See the California State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6172.
(West 1974) and the California Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 Cal. 3d Rules 51-58
(1970). See also Pollock, Sanctions Imposed By Courts On Attorneys Who Abuse
The Judicial Process, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 619 (1977) for other possible judicial sanc-
tions.
53. See Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal. 2d 618, 381 P.2d 645, 30
Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963). As vendor of a piece of property, the plaintiff, due to negli-
gence of the escrow holder, was required to protect his interest by bringing a quiet
title action against the purchaser. Subsequently suing the escrow holder, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover the amount of attorney's fees he had expended in
the quiet title action.
54. Illustrating, in Prentice, but for the escrow holder's tortious activities, the
plaintiff would not have been forced into expenditures for needless litigation to
protect his interests. In Bauguess, but for the appellant's misconduct, the respon-
dent would not have been forced to make expenditures later rendered needless by
said conduct. In both cases, the malefactor forced innocent parties to pay attor-
ney's fees which would not have been necessary had the malefactor acted prop-
erly. The analogy is, however, limited. In the case where tortious conduct causes
needless litigation, the tort may consist of mere negligence. Were attorney's fees
awarded for counselor negligence causing mistrial, concern for imperiling zealous
advocacy would become legitimate. See text accompanying notes 85-87, supra.
for oppressive, invalid reasons. 55 "Bad faith is the equivalent of
dishonesty, fraud and concealment" 56 and may be found in ac-
tions leading to the lawsuit or in the conduct of litigation.57 As
discussed in Young v. Redman, equity allows awards of this type
to deter needless litigation and to preserve the foundation upon
which free access to the judiciary rests. 58
Where attorney misconduct results in mistrial, a situation
analogous to bad faith litigation exists and the rationale for al-
lowing attorney's fees should be sufficiently persuasive to permit
fee sanctions. When a lawyer attempts covertly to gain informa-
tion forbidden to him or seeks to persuade jurors outside the
courtroom, he is acting deceitfully. By acting in bad faith and
consequently causing mistrial, he effectuates the same conse-
quences caused by the "bad faith litigant"-the expenditure of
money by the opposing party in needless litigation and the wast-
ing of valuable court time.
The rationale behind attorney's fees for bad faith litigation is
analogous to and should sustain the demand for attorney's fees in
the misconduct/mistrial context. Were attorney's fees assessed
to the deviant lawyer, the injured party would be compensated,
attorney misbehavior would be deterred and the concept of "fair
play," upon which zealous advocacy rests, would be advanced. 59
"'Equity does not wait upon precedence which exactly squares
with the facts in controversy, but will assert itself in those situa-
tions where right and justice would be defeated but for its inter-
vention'."60 Certainly the misconduct/mistrial situation is one
which begs for equitable intervention to allow the attorney fee
55. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1972). For California authority, see County of
Inyo v. City of L.A., 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 91, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77 (1978). ("Finally, we
turn to the 'vexatious litigant' ground asserted in support of the attorney fee. We
assume existence of power to make the award on this ground .... ); Williams v.
MacDougall, 39 Cal. 80, 85-86 (1870). While it may be true that Young v. Redman,
55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976) refused to extend such power to the
trial court level, the refusal was based, not upon disagreement with the rationale
behind such an allowance, but upon fear that such power would be misused at
that level. Id. at 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. For rebuttal of that fear in the miscon-
duct/mistrial context, see text at notes 78-92, supra.
56. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16 (1967).
57. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
58. 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 93 (1976).
59. The majority in Bauguess recognizes such a foundation of fair play and
good faith when, in discussing the independence of the bar, it explains that coun-
sel may properly urge even an untenable proposition provided he does so "in good
faith" and "does not resort to deceit." 22 Cal. 3d at 638, 586 P.2d at 949, 150 Cal.
Rptr. at 468. See also text accompanying notes 85-87, infra.
60. Satterfield v. Garmire, 65 Cal. 2d 638, 645, 422 P.2d 990, 995, 56 Cal. Rptr. 102,
107 (1967).
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sanction else injustice be done to the party suffering economic
loss in the face of an aborted trial.
B. Supervisory Justification for the Attorney Fee Sanction
Perceiving no fitting equitable exception to the general rule dis-
allowing attorney's fees, the majority in Bauguess turns its atten-
tion to the scope of trial court supervisory powers.61 Recognizing
the trial court's ability "to secure compliance with its orders, to
punish contempt and to control its proceedings," 62 the supreme
court rejects the imposition of attorney fee sanctions for the cau-
sation of a mistrial as part of such power.
Citing several cases in support of its conclusion, the court judi-
ciously avoids explanation of the cases. Indeed, under close scru-
tiny, none of the cases stand as solid proponents for the court's
broad ruling.
Wisniewski v. Clary63 involved the failure of plaintiff to attend
a mandatory settlement conference. Written policy of the particu-
lar Los Angeles Superior Court declared that if a defendant were
absent from mandatory conference, counsel fees might be im-
posed. Regarding the written policy as a valid exercise of the trial
court's power, the appellate court interpreted the rule strictly and
disallowed the attorney fee sanction because it had been levied
against the plaintiff. Significantly, the appellate court did not
strike down the policy itself but held the power of the trial court
to write its own regulations was inherent in the court and active
apart from legislative grant by statute.64 While the specific facts
required disallowance of the sanction, the Wisniewski court con-
firmed the power of the trial court to levy attorney fee sanctions
for improper conduct.
Young v. Redman65 is cited as an example of the disallowance
of attorney's fees when there has been a bad faith defense or fail-
ure of a party to appear at trial. Young, however, deals mainly
with equitable rather than supervisory powers and cannot prop-
erly be used as support for denial of the sanction as a tool in a
court's supervisory repertoire. Although the case initially deals
61. See note 3, supra.
62. 22 Cal. 3d at 637, 586 P.2d at 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467; cf. Bloniarz v.
Roloson, 70 Cal. 2d 143, 147-48, 449 P.2d 221, 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1969).
63. 46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1975).
64. Id. at 504, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
65. 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976).
with a lower court exercise of supervisory power in denying plain-
tilt's motion for continuance, the bulk of the opinion discusses the
reasons the court believes equitable attorney fee sanctions are in-
appropriate in the face of vexatious litigation.66
Finally, Welgross v. End67 is included as an instance in which
an appellate court overturned fees awarded due to plaintiff's dila-
tory conduct at the discovery stage. In Welgross the deciding fac-
tor was the "purely punitive" nature of the award.68 Inasmuch as
the sanction was utilized solely as a punishing device and not for
the proper purpose of securing compliance with court order,69 the
court struck down the award as an abuse of trial court discre-
tion.70 The citation to Welgross is of interest because its facts are
directly analogous to those found in Bauguess. The Bauguess
court also finds the trial court's motivation punitive and properly
expressed only through contempt sanctions.71 But Welgross' ap-
plication to the misconduct/mistrial situation is questionable. In
the misconduct/mistrial instance, attorney's fees would be
awarded chiefly to compensate the innocent party for expenses of
needless litigation and to guarantee attorney obedience and effi-
cient litigation in the future.72 Under such circumstances, the ra-
tionale behind Welgross would not apply and for this reason
Welgross provides no basis for the rule of Bauguess, which enve-
lopes the misconduct/mistrial situation within its broad holding.
Again, the supreme court fails to squarely approach the issue in
its discussion of the alleged absence of statutory or legislative in-
t6nt to justify a grant of attorney's fees upon mistrial. Discussing
Fairfield v. Superior Court,73 the court limits its holding to the
particular facts of the case without examining the appellate
court's discussion of legislative intent, an integral part of the deci-
sion. In Fairfield, the trial court allowed plaintiff attorney's fees
when defendant refused to obey an order compelling further an-
swers to interrogatories. Although the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 2030 provided for a motion and possible court order to
compel further answers, it did not authorize attorney's fees when
such an order went unheeded. Nor did Section 2034, which au-
66. Id. at 834-39, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 90-94. See notes 40 and 50, supra. The court's
discussion of attorney's fees is not aimed at judicial supervisory power to award
fees after denying motion for continuance. Rather, it is directed at the trial court's
equitable powers to do so when a party insists upon maintenance of a suit in bad
faith and for oppressive reasons.
67. 252 Cal. App. 2d 982, 61 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1967).
68. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d at 637, 586 P.2d at 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
69. 252 Cal. App. 2d at 992, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
70. Id. at 991, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
71. See text at notes 14-35, supra.
72. See text at notes 75-76, infra.
73. 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966).
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thorized attorney fee sanctions in certain other specified situa-
tions. Upholding the trial court award, the appellate court
reasoned that to reject the award would be to contravene the leg-
islature's intent in enacting the Civil Discovery Act.74 One of the
principle purposes behind the Act being to "allow for efficient, ec-
onomical disposition of cases," 75 the Fairfield court authorized
the award absent statutory text on point because it felt such
would be necessary to force the further answers requisite to effi-
cient discovery.
Indeed, the Civil Discovery Act evidences legislative intent to
provide for smooth, efficient litigation by allowing attorney's fees
and to provide compensation to the party suffering needless ex-
pense when attempting to expedite the judicial process. 7 6 Allow-
ance of attorney fee sanctions in the misconduct/mistrial
situation would fulfill both of these purposes, in accordance with
the Legislature's goals. By allowing attorney's fees to the victim
of an aborted trial resulting from opposing counsel's actions, the
court would be compensating one who had suffered needless ex-
penses through no fault of his own. Allowance of such a sanction
would also compel future obedience by the malefactor and thus
provide for smooth, efficient litigation when and if the case is re-
tried.
The fact that there is no statute precisely authorizing attorney
fee sanctions upon mistrial provides no reason for blanket denial
of such sanctions. Fairfield is only one of a number of cases in
which the judiciary has adopted supervisory rules pursuant to
legislative intent, absent specific statutory authorization. 77
Obvious practical reasons exist for utilizing legislative intent as
74. Fairfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 120, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
75. Id. at 119, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
76. CAL. Cy. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West Supp. 1979) throughout, requires the
party failing to comply with court order to pay the moving party "reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney fees." See
§§ (a), (b) (2) (iv), (c) and (d). See also Allen v. Pitchess, 36 Cal. App. 3d 321, 111
Cal. Rptr. 658 (1973); Sigerseth v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 427, 1100 Cal.
Rptr. 185 (1972).
77. E.g., Wisniewski v. Clary, 46 Cal. App. 3d 499, 120 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1975),
where the trial court's power to write policy requiring attorney fee sanctions was
approved pursuant to the legislative intent displayed in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070
(West Supp. 1979), which authorizes courts to formulate rules for its officers. See
text at notes 63-64, supra. See also Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v.
Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 675, 140 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1977), in which the court
upheld a trial court requirement that petitioners post a bond, absent statute ne-
cessitating the same. Since the Code required bond posting in other similar situa-
a guide in formulating rules unauthorized specifically by statute.
The Legislature cannot possibly draft a law for each obscure cir-
cumstance that arises. Pursuant then to their intent in writing
the Civil Discovery Act, the supreme court should have provided
for attorney's fees in the misconduct/mistrial situation. The
court's restraint in doing so was not based exclusively upon the
lack of statutory authority, but also upon fears of the abuse of un-
limited power at the trial court level.
C. The Sufficiency of Safeguards to Limit Abuse of the Attorney
Fee Sanction
The court expresses reluctance to unleash power without ap-
propriate safeguards and guidelines. 78 While a trial court's power
to punish contempt is tempered by legislative enactment, 79 the
power to award attorney's fees for mistrial would have no statu-
tory safeguards.80 This consideration has not stopped judicial ap-
proval of supervisory exercises in other areas, 81 nor should it be
sufficient in this area. A trial court would remain adequately lim-
ited by equitable "reasonableness" and sufficiently policed, as in
other contexts, by the appellate standard of review. Both the
Civil Discovery Act and the cases allowing equitable attorney's
fees state that such trial court allowances must be "reasonable"
in amount.8 2 And as with all trial court decisions, the award could
be overturned by an appellate court finding of the "abuse of dis-
cretion."83
tions, the constructive legislative intent was found to allow it in the immediate
context as well.
78. 22 Cal. 3d at 639, 586 P. 3d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
79. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§ 1209-1222 (West Supp. 1979); see also In Re
McKinney, 70 Cal. 2d 8, 11-13, 447 P.2d 972, 73 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1968); cf. In Re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 274-76 (1948).
80. Cf. identical fear expressed in "bad faith" litigation context. Young v.
Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 838, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 93. Contra, Fairfield v. Superior
Court, 246 Cal. App. 3d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966) where the court countered such
fear by surmising that the trial court's power will not be unlimited and will remain
an ability only "to make orders... as are just." 246 Cal. App. at 120, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 726.
81. See text at notes 73-76 and note 77, supra.
82. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 2034 (West Supp. 1979) tempers its compensatory
allowances of attorney's fees with the adjective "reasonable." (See (a), (b) (2) (iv),
(c), and (d). Quinn v. State, in discussing thoroughly the equitable "common
fund" theory, emphasizes the "reasonable" limitation on fee awards. 15 Cal. 3d
162, 539 P.2d 761, 124 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). For an excellent discussion of federal stat-
utory attorney fee awards and a suggestion of a formula to determine the reasona-
bleness of such awards, see Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What Is
"Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1977).
83. See 6 WrrKIN, CALroRiuA PROCEDURE, Appeal §§ 242-45, at 4234-36 (2d ed.
1971). The Supreme Court's failure to recognize the standard as an adequate
check on trial court power may display their displeasure with the traditional resili-
ency of the standard. While it is true that the standard generally is a tough one to
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The majority cites the trial judge's actions as illustrative of the
danger that would exist were they to carve out another exception.
But again, the trial judge's award was improperly motivated and
the facts called for contempt sanctions, if any.84 Were attorney's
fees awarded in lieu of correct contempt sanctions, the appellate
court could properly find abuse of discretion and overturn the
award. Were the award based upon proper considerations, the
amount would be regulated by the "reasonable" standard, and
safeguards would be adequate.
Second of the apprehensions expressed by the court is that the
supervisory awarding of attorney's fees might imperil indepen-
dence of the bar and inhibit zealous advocacy. Again, the court's
fear and analysis is tainted by their interpretation of the facts in
Bauguess and its rationale cannot be applied to the miscon-
duct/mistrial situation. A mere reading of the court's own quote
from Smith v. Superior Court85 evidences a qualification of the at-
torney's advocacy rights: "'Even if a legal proposition is untena-
ble, counsel may properly urge it in good faith; he may do so even
though he may not expect to be successful, provided of course,
that he does not resort to deceit or to willful obstruction of the or-
derly process'" (emphasis added). 86 In the misconduct situation,
an attorney has exceeded his boundaries by attempting to
deceive the judge or prejudice the trial. In such a situation, a
sanction would not inhibit free exercise of a right but would deter
the abuse of that right, protecting the very basis of good faith
upon which the independence of the bar and the adverary system
rest.8 7
Denying adequate procedural due process to an attorney in the
appellant's position is the last of the supreme court's concerns. It
suggests four aspects that cast doubt on whether the appropriate
level of due process was offered the appellant: 1) the trial judge
hadn't personally observed appellant's alleged misconduct but
meet, it would not be so in the attorney fee context because of the relative ease
with which attorney's fees can be computed and the resultant obvious nature of
an extensive trial court award. See Fairfield v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. App. 2d
113, 120, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721, 725, (1966), stating that even though a trial court has
wide discretion in discovery matters, the sanctions it may levy are still limited to
those which are "suitable and necessary."
84. See text at notes 14-35, supra.
85. 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968), quoting Gallagher v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 31 Cal. 2d 784, 192 P. 2d 905 (1948).
86. 22 Cal. 3d at 638, 586 P. 2d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
87. See note 59, supra.
heard the motion for sanction, 2) the hearing was based not upon
actual record but on the participant's "somewhat imperfect mem-
ories of the events," 3) the appellant did not contest the award be-
cause he was fearful the testimony would prejudice him at the
contempt hearing, and 4) the penalty assessed was in excess of
that permitted for contempt.88 These factors appear insubstantial
and add little to the majority opinion. A trial judge often receives
and acts upon second-hand evidence in the contempt context.89
Surely evidence is also validly introduced where no official in-
court record has been made.90 While the no-contest concern is
proper, it would not be so in the misconduct/mistrial situation be-
cause, as previously outlined, the attorney would be subjected to
either contempt or attorney fee sanctions.91 The penalty assessed
in this particular case exceeded the highest permissible amount
of contempt sanctions, as presently regulated by appellate checks
and balances. 92 Although the concerns may be valid to an extent
it is again important to observe that they arise uniquely out of the
specific facts in Bauguess v. Paine, interpreted by the majority as
failing to show attorney misconduct. Therefore, they supply little
substantive support for the rule of the case, which covers all mis-
trial situations, including those caused by counselor impropriety.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court in Bauguess v. Paine fails to
limit its ruling to the specific facts at hand and in so doing pro-
nounces a rule that is patently overbroard in effect. Finding no
attorney misconduct in evidence, the court approaches the issue
of the awarding of attorney's fees upon mistrial in a generalized
fashion and ignores the more limited situation in which an attor-
ney's improprieties cause the mistrial. By denying trial court au-
thority to award attorney's fees in all mistrial situations, the
majority avoids equitable and supervisory considerations which
mandate such awards in the face of counsel improbity. Equity,
88. 22 Cal. 3d at 639, 586 P. 2d at 949-50, 150 Cal. at 468-69.
'89. This is the case when a party disobeys a court-ordered injunction. Receiv-
ing word from the one being harmed or third persons, the judge can issue an order
to the party requiring him to reappear before the court and show cause why he
should not be held in contempt. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1212 (West 1972).
90. While this concern would be very important at the appellate level, because
of the necessity of a written record to challenge lower court action, the lack of a
record in this case would, from all indications, have mattered little.
91. See text at note 84, supra.
92. See note 33, supra. While the $700 awarded by the trial court exceeded the
$600 provision of CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1218 (West Supp. 1979), it did not exceed
the potential monetary loss by an attorney when he is found guilty of contempt.
Section 1218 alternatively provides for five days in jail, for which the denial of
wages for most attorneys would exceed the $700 levied.
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legislative intent, and the existence of adequate judicial safe-
guards collectively lend credence to a more liberal rule in the
misconduct/mistrial situation. The high court's failure to distin-
guish the misconduct/mistrial situation comes at the expense of
none other than the innocent litigant, forced to pay his own attor-
neys for time laid waste by opposing counsel's improper activi-
ties.
STEVEN D. CAMPEN

